Sderot left exposed: Israeli probe uncovers miscommunication, lack of preparedness during October 7 attack

The Israel Defence Forces “failed in its mission to protect the residents of Sderot” according to a military report on Hamas’ October 7 attack on the city released on Wednesday.

The findings, part of a broader investigation into the military’s response to the surprise attack, paint a picture of unpreparedness, miscommunication, and logistical breakdowns that left the city vulnerable for hours.

The city, of around 31,000, is about one km away from the Gaza border.

The terrorists, primarily from Hamas’s elite Nukhba unit, stormed Sderot beginning at 6:58 a.m., quickly reaching key points, including the police station, a shopping centre, and the Ahuza neighbourhood. According to the IDF probe, the city’s local emergency defence squad was armed only with pistols, having been denied rifles over a bureaucratic dispute more than a year prior. The team had also received no formal training or IDF support in two years.

“The city’s emergency squad was left with only handguns to face heavily armed terrorists,” the report stated. “There was no command post, no defense plan, and insufficient coordination.”

The most intense fighting occurred at the police station, where terrorists killed officers and fortified themselves. One officer, using only his service weapon, managed to kill four terrorists from the rooftop. A rescue operation began at 7:39 a.m. but was unsuccessful. Only by 1:49 p.m. was the last wounded officer evacuated, and the battle raged until the following morning, ending with the destruction of the building. Sixteen people died there, including ten police officers.

The report also confirmed that the city had no formal defensive perimeter despite its proximity to the Gaza Strip. “The IDF failed in its mission to protect the residents of Sderot,” the report concluded. “It was simply not prepared for such a scenario — an Israeli city invaded by terrorists.”

The IDF’s alert systems also faltered. While rocket sirens were triggered, no specific warning about the infiltration was sent in time. Most residents, many of them observant Jews, were in synagogues for Sabbath morning prayers and unaware of the invasion. Authorities sent a text alert, but it went largely unnoticed.

“If we had issued a timely infiltration warning,” the report noted, “it could have prevented terrorists from reaching populated areas. Roadblocks could have been set up. Lives could have been saved.”

Compounding the chaos, a misleading video circulating on social media prompted hundreds of soldiers to divert to Sderot independently, believing the city had been fully overrun. As a result, forces were drawn away from other communities under simultaneous attack. At one point, around 1,000 troops were in the city — but many lacked clear orders or operational coordination.

The probe confirmed that Sderot’s control centre collapsed early in the fighting, and a lack of real-time information further hampered efforts. “Command and control disintegrated under the pressure of simultaneous attacks,” said a senior IDF official. “Forces operated without knowing the full picture.”

Hamas had meticulously planned the incursion. Armed pickup trucks entered under cover of a heavy rocket barrage — 45 rockets were fired at the city that day, 10 of them in the first 45 minutes. Terrorists killed 13 elderly civilians waiting for a day trip outside a locked shelter and tried to storm a synagogue in the Ahuza neighbourhood. One resident and a police officer were killed before anti-terror units arrived and neutralized the attackers.

By the end of the battle, 39 terrorists had been killed and two captured. Though no hostages were taken in Sderot, unlike in other communities, the scale of destruction and loss of life was devastating. Among the 53 dead were 37 civilians, 11 police officers, three soldiers, and two firefighters.

According to a series of army probes — summaries of which have been released in recent weeks — some 5,000 terrorists from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad managed to attack numerous Israeli communities and overrun the army’s border positions. The army’s chain of command broke amid the chaos and soldiers were outnumbered.

They also found that the army misunderstood Hamas’s intentions for years, and as October 7 approached, intelligence about the looming attack was misinterpreted. The military was also more focused on threats from Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The IDF probes only deal with issues of operations, intelligence and command, not decisions made by the political echelon.

At least 1,180 people were killed, and 252 Israelis and foreigners were taken hostage in Hamas’s attacks on Israeli communities near the Gaza border on October 7. Of the 59 remaining hostages, 36 are believed to be dead.