Israeli expert suggests new ideas for dealing with West Bank and Gaza

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The latest Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council webinar featured Shany Mor, a former Director for Foreign Policy for Israel’s National Security Council, whose topic was, “From Jenin to Gaza: Managing the Conflict”.

He warned that there has been a recent unravelling of the status quo between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel has used three different strategies since 2005 –  varying in terms of the presence and freedom of action for the IDF, presence or absence of settlers, and international arrangements.

In 2005, he explained, when Israel withdrew from Gaza, it also withdrew from four settlements around Jenin, which is a hotbed of jihadism. This created an entire sector of the West Bank with no Israeli civilian presence, but an IDF presence. In Gaza, there is no Israeli presence, and no real international presence either. In the rest of the West Bank, there is both a settler and IDF presence.

Around Jenin, he said, with no settlements, there is full freedom of action for the IDF, there is an international presence which is felt through the  cooperation between the IDF and the PA. In the 15 years between 2005 and 2020, he added, the Jenin sector was by far the quietest area of the West Bank in terms of terrorism, so the formula worked, at least in the short term, until it started to unravel in 2020.

It unravelled, he explained, because COVID stopped Israeli Arabs travelling to Jenin to shop and do business there, which was bad for the economy, and because of disagreements with the PA. Pressure on the PA began to grow as the question of succession to ageing PA President Mahmoud Abbas intensified, and it came to a head with the terror wave of early 2022, much of which came from Jenin.

Unlike Arafat, he explained, Abbas wants there to be one Palestinian armed force, rather than terror groups, but militant groups nevertheless began to regroup and carry out attacks in Israel. This meant the IDF stepped up arrests, leading to an increase in friction and violence, and things that had previously been managed with cooperation could no longer be. Then the arrest of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leader in the West Bank led to conflict from Gaza.

He said PIJ, closer to Iran than Hamas, began making demands, including his release and immunity for other West Bank terrorists, and threatening it would attack from Gaza. It thought it could succeed because there was a new Israeli government, that Hamas would get involved, that it would get support from the Arab world, and that it could kill Israelis.

However, he added, Iron Dome was at its most effective  so far  in protecting Israel; civilian casualties in Gaza were fewer than in previous conflicts, and the worst instance was shown to have been caused by a PIJ rocket. Israel showed it had learnt from previous conflicts and was more disciplined in its targeting, its messaging and its relations with regional countries and allies, and finished the conflict in three days without seeking to accomplish unrealistic goals. PIJ, on the other hand, repeated its previous mistakes.

However, he said, Israel is still unable to untangle the issue at a strategic level, and still doesn’t know what to do with Gaza and the West Bank. The 15-year status quo allowed Israel to manage the conflict at low cost, but that status quo is effectively gone, and there is a deadline in that Abbas won’t be around for much longer.

He noted that generally Israeli governments tend not to do well politically out of conflicts, but interim PM Yair Lapid was determined not to repeat past mistakes. He avoided anything that might cause significant Palestinian civilian casualties, defended Israel better, and made a strong diplomatic effort regionally and internationally.

Hamas, he said, stayed out of the fighting because it is not interested in a conflict now, and didn’t want to risk its only economic lifeline – permits for Gazans to work in Israel – which resumed the day after the fighting ceased. It also wants to position itself to be ready in the West Bank when Abbas leaves power. PIJ, he added, suffered a significant blow, and was surprised Israel could locate its senior operatives, but retained its best rockets and can replace those it lost, so remains a threat.

Asked what Israel should do as a strategy for the West Bank and Gaza now, he replied that in general it can operate on four planes – bilaterally with the Palestinians, regionally with the Arab states, globally and unilaterally. The best strategy is to work on all four at once, and pick the most advantageous avenue on each. A bilateral negotiation to end the conflict is a fantasy for now, but Israel can take steps to make it more likely in future.

He suggested Israel take coordinated unilateral steps after talking to the USA or perhaps the PA. There are nine or ten settlements out of the 125 which evacuating would make the conflict more manageable and benefit both the IDF and Palestinians, he argued. Regionally, there’s a place to bring in some Arab states on some broad, general abstract understandings.

The regional aspect is important, he said, because the worst thing that happened to the Palestinians was that their struggle was subsumed by the cosmic Arab struggle against Israel, leaving no room for compromise. No other liberation struggle found itself so restricted. Theirs is a struggle for elimination, not liberation.

He added that the Palestinians see the Abraham Accords as a betrayal, but they are actually the best thing that could happen to them. In the past, the Arab world has prevented the Palestinians compromising, but now it will help them to do so.  So it’s a good thing for Israel, the region and the Palestinians, and the world should encourage more normalisation, Mor said

He also said he was sceptical about any economic path to peace, because although economic development is good for the Palestinian areas, it won’t solve the long-term problems or make the Palestinians accept settlements.

Speaking about the succession to Abbas, Mor argued a more moderate leader is unlikely as there is no way for any Palestinian to consolidate power in the West Bank, Gaza and the Palestinian movement internationally by advocating peace with Israel.

Discussing the recent article he wrote on the mental scars of the Second Intifada, Mor noted that there was not just a breach of trust from the Palestinians for Israelis, but also from global public opinion, so that wanting international approval no longer has the same currency in Israel. This is because Israel found itself more blamed and more reviled than it had been before when the peace process exploded in its face, and there is no indication after 20 years that has been undone, he concluded.

The way for the Palestinians to build trust with Israel, and reverse the scars of those  times, Mor said, is to say definitively that they accept Israel and want to live in peace as a neighbour.  But he also indicated he doesn’t see any such change on the horizon.

Abbas’ recent “50 Holocausts” comment in Germany will have little fallout, he noted. It’s not his first slip up, but he will always be branded as the moderate alternative, even though he is not a reliable partner for reaching peace – it’s just not on his agenda.

On the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran, Mor said Israel would like the sunset clauses removed, and for the deal to cover ballistic missiles and a commitment from Iran “not to seek to destroy another member state of the United Nations.”

AIJAC